{"id":45390,"date":"2025-10-17T16:09:24","date_gmt":"2025-10-17T13:09:24","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/euroarab-int.com\/?p=45390"},"modified":"2025-10-17T16:09:24","modified_gmt":"2025-10-17T13:09:24","slug":"the-two-frenemies-china-and-russia","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/euroarab-int.com\/?p=45390","title":{"rendered":"The two frenemies \u2014 China and Russia"},"content":{"rendered":"Between alliance and rivalry lies a secret key revealed by interests and the equations of supply and demand. They are driven by the forces that shape consumption and production, and by a relentless race for abundant resources and the search for alternatives\u2014energy, water, and more. Added to this is the growing demand for weapons, accompanied by the struggle for dominance over seas, oceans, and waterways.
\nThis is clearly reflected in the alliance between Russia and China. Were it not for the presence of their common enemy, the United States of America, you would see hordes of Chinese armies striving with determination to invade Russia, and Russian ballistic missiles lighting up the skies over Beijing.
\nThe conflict between them is ancient, as old as time itself. Each seeks to assert its presence on the global stage and to dominate the wealth of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, extending all the way to the Arctic Ocean.
\nHow are Russia and China seeking to assert their political, economic, and military presence? What should the United States do in the face of this expansion to defend its interests and dominance over the entire world? And what is the true relationship between the development of the arms industry and the continuation of wars in the region?
\nAt the outset, Russia and China each held a distinct presence and influence: the Russian Bear entered the region through the gates of weaponry, while the Chinese Dragon pierced its skies through the realm of economy. Yet soon, their competition diversified and took on many faces.
\nBefore 2015, the Russian presence in the Middle East was scarcely noticeable, despite maintaining a military base on the Syrian coast. That base, however, remained largely inactive as Moscow awaited the downfall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad \u2014 and the identity of his successor. At the time, Russia was preoccupied with its war against Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea.
\nBut suddenly, in that very year, its gaze shifted toward deeper advancement across the world \u2014 particularly in the Middle East \u2014 to safeguard and fortify its sphere of dominance. Through Syria, Russia cemented its foothold by establishing military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim, granting it access to the region\u2019s warm waters and tempting it toward further expansion. By early 2019, the Bear\u2019s pawprints reached Libya, through the \u201cBears Battalion,\u201d extending Moscow\u2019s shadow even farther across the southern sands.
\nIt also strengthened its presence in the Arab Republic of Egypt through agreements in 2018, which included the sale of MiG-29 fighter jets worth $2 billion. Its ambitions did not stop there, but extended to Algeria, with which it signed a military cooperation agreement in 2020, transforming Algeria into the largest importer of Russian equipment and weapons. In 2023, Russia also signed defense and security contracts with both the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Prior to that, it concluded a major deal with Turkey in 2017 to import 9400 air defense systems worth up to $25 billion.
\nThe arms deals did not stop there; they stretched far beyond mere sales to include the maintenance of the weapons and training in their use \u2014 ensuring that the importing nations remain under the shadow of the supplier\u2019s influence. This dynamic has rendered most Syrian territories \u2014 with the exception of the Kurdish regions \u2014 subordinate to the dominance of Russian corporations, along with their vast wealth, particularly in oil and gas. The same holds true for Libya, and for the gold mines of Sudan. In the latter, Russia supports both sides of the conflict \u2014 the national army and the Rapid Support Forces alike. This dual engagement is not born merely of Russia\u2019s appetite for expansion, but of its need to wage two parallel battles: one against its American adversary, and another with its uneasy ally \u2014 the Chinese dragon. So how does the confrontation between these two \u201cfriendly rivals\u201d unfold across the Middle East?
\nIndeed, China’s presence in the Middle East is clear, and so is its competition with Russia. These agreements and deals have provided a gateway for China into the Arab region. In 2018, it signed a cooperation agreement with the Silk Road Fund, represented by ACWA Power, with Saudi Arabia to invest billions of dollars in renewable energy. In 2023, China and Saudi Arabia signed contracts worth more than $10 billion in the energy and petrochemical industries.
\nChina also signed $2 billion worth agreements with Iraq, the country with the world’s largest oil reserves, in 2020 to develop oil fields. Chinese companies are also building the new administrative capital in the Arab Republic of Egypt, with investments amounting to $45 billion. In addition, China cooperates with the Islamic Republic of Iran\u2014the Arabs’ troublesome neighbor\u2014with which it signed a strategic partnership agreement in 2012, including $460 billion in Chinese investments in Iranian infrastructure and the oil and gas sectors.
\nOn the military front \u2014 and despite Russia\u2019s long-standing dominance in arms exports to the Middle East and Arab world \u2014 Beijing has surprised many through the striking presence of its NORINCO Group, particularly in the fields of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missile systems; as in 2022, Saudi Arabia purchased China\u2019s CH-4 drone for $700 million. Also, several military cooperation agreements were signed between Beijing and Cairo in the defense industry, including the supply of Chinese aircraft to Egypt.
\nAmid this growing presence, competition, and the combined military and economic weight of both powers, one question arises: What is the position of the United States regarding this rivalry between China and Russia in the Arab region?!
\nIn fact, the United States fears this new \u201ccold rivalry\u201d between Moscow and Beijing, for it comes at Washington\u2019s expense, shrinking its once-unquestioned share of influence. The Arab region \u2014 long considered an American domain \u2014 is now being divided among three major powers, with Turkey and Iran also pressing for their own place at the table.
\nThe Americans have long expressed their discontent and concern, issuing multiple warnings and messages regarding the military deals linking China, Russia, and the Arab states \u2014 as well as their growing unease over expanding geo-economic and investment influence. This tension was clearly reflected in the clash between Beijing and Washington in Iraq over reconstruction and development contracts, which ultimately ended in a form of shared division between the two sides.
\nSimilarly, in Egypt, which once relied almost entirely on American weaponry, the country\u2019s arsenal has now diversified to include both Russian and Chinese arms. The same pattern is seen in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates which were once Washington\u2019s closest allies, as USA previously held the lion\u2019s share of influence, before the increased influence of the Chinese Dragon and the Russian Bear.
\nThe Sino-Russian competition remains a cold and covert struggle, unlikely to turn into open conflict unless both powers are left alone in the region \u2014 without their fiercest rival, the United States. Thus, this rivalry will endure, as geopolitical shifts have intertwined interests and divided spheres of influence. Therefore, China has been driven into the arms trade by these evolving realities, while Russia, under the pressure of Western sanctions, has been pushed to pursue economic and investment ventures, creating new opportunities for its companies. In this complex contest, the United States pays the price, while the Arab nations reap the benefit \u2014 gaining diversity in both allies and sources of power.
\nRussia’s goal has always been and continues to be to impose its will in the region. According to General Clausewitz, a Prussian general and military historian born in 1780, one of his most important works was Vomkviege (The Art of War). One of his most important theories was: “A national army that fights for the nation shows greater determination than professional soldiers who fight only for territory. For him, war is a continuation of diplomacy by other means, as the political interests of the nation must be considered more important than military objectives. There is a strong relationship between the balance of power and political and military objectives in war.” For this philosopher, war is a form of violence aimed at coercing the opponent to impose our will. Violence is merely the means, while the ultimate goal is the imposition of will.
\nConsequently, and in its pursuit of dominance, Russia sought to strengthen and expand its relations with the Arab world. These relations, however, have passed through fluctuating phases of stagnation and revival, reflecting a complex interplay of political and economic factors. Between 2011 and 2020, trade relations between Russia and the Arab countries remained relatively modest \u2014 accounting for 2.1% of Russia\u2019s total foreign trade, and only 0.8% of the Arab states\u2019 overall foreign trade on average.
\nMeanwhile, the volume of Russian direct investment projects in Arab nations between 2003 and 2021 amounted to around 5% of total foreign investments in the region, while Arab investments in Russia represented merely 1% of total foreign investments within Russia.
\nArab countries implemented 39 direct projects in Russia at a total cost of $3.8 billion, creating more than 12,000 jobs. The following years witnessed a boom at a rate of more than four projects per year. Arab investments were concentrated in the financial services and real estate sectors, in terms of investment costs and new jobs, accounting for between 42% and 54%, respectively.
\nThe United Arab Emirates is among the most significant Arab investors in Russia, with 25 projects implemented by 20 companies, representing 64% of the total and 62% of the investment cost. Qatar follows with projects exceeding $1 billion in investment costs, representing 29% of the total between 2012 and 2021.
\nBetween 2003 and 2021, Russian companies invested in 140 projects in Arab countries, with an investment cost of $64.5 billion, creating more than 34,000 job opportunities.
\nThe year 2017 also witnessed a surge in investment volume, reaching $32.5 billion across more than ten projects, the most notable of which is the Dabaa nuclear power plant in the Arab Republic of Egypt, with an investment cost estimated at $30 billion. Russia has focused its projects on coal, oil, gas, and energy, accounting for 30% of the total and approximately 92% of the investment cost.
\nGeographically, Russian investments were concentrated in Egypt at 48% in terms of cost, 19% in Iraq, and 27% in Jordan. In terms of numbers, they were concentrated in the UAE at 40%, followed by Egypt at 14% and Iraq at 11%. In 2022, four Arab countries accounted for 73.1% of Arab-Russian trade, respectively: the UAE, Egypt, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.
\nThese four countries topped the list of the most important exporting countries to Russia, with successive percentages: 47%, 22%, 12.7%, and 7.8%. Arab exports to Russia were represented in minerals and raw materials, accounting for 54%, manufactured goods for 40% and agricultural raw materials for 4.2% in 2020.
\nRussian exports to Arab countries averaged $31 billion annually between 2011 and 2020. The UAE, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt accounted for the largest share, with food products accounting for 35%, manufactured goods for 26.4%, fuel for 7.6%, pearls, precious stones, and gold for 10.2%, raw materials and metals for 4.7%, and agricultural goods and raw materials for 26%.
\nThe volume of global export credit insurance operations directed to Arab countries in the short, medium and long term has reached approximately $165 billion annually, representing approximately 8.5% of the total operations in the world, covering 20% \u200b\u200bof Arab commodity imports.
\nThis economic cooperation between Arabs and Russia has played a significant role in the increase and diversification of projects, thus creating new job opportunities in both regions. Russian investments in Arab countries have diversified, exceeding 42 projects in the oil, coal and gas sectors, providing 9,000 jobs; real estate with 6,000 jobs or more; more than 11 projects in the metals sector, providing 4,730 jobs; tourism, hotels and auto parts manufacturing, providing 8,610 jobs; and transportation and storage, providing 700 jobs, in addition to many other sectors, thus creating numerous job opportunities.
\nIn contrast, Arab projects in Russia have played a significant role in diversifying investments and increasing employment; namely in the real estate sector, which has provided more than 7,000 jobs; in the coal, oil, and gas sectors, where 2,700 jobs have been created; in the transportation and storage sectors, more than 800 jobs have been created; in the hotel and tourism sector, 1,500 jobs have been created; and in other sectors too.
\nThis economic cooperation and its development between the Arabs and Russia demonstrate the great importance of the Middle East\u2019s geographical location. It is the crossroads of the ancient world\u2019s continents and overlooks some of the most significant seas: the Caspian, the Mediterranean, the Black sea, the Red sea, the Arabian Gulf, and the Arabian Sea. Moreover, it contains some of the world\u2019s most vital maritime passages, such as the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Strait of Hormuz.
\nIn essence, the Middle East serves as Russia\u2019s southern gateway. Since ancient times, Tsarist Russia has sought to expand and establish an active presence in the region to gain access to warm waters. This ambition drove it to wage wars against the Persian and Ottoman Empires in the years 1813, 1826, 1828, 1829, and 1853.
\nThe Soviet Union then sought to realize that long-standing dream by establishing a military presence during the 1960s and 1970s in Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Algeria, Iraq, and Syria. However, this presence gradually declined following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, took advantage of the hesitation of the Obama administration to make decisive decisions regarding the region\u2019s crises, swiftly moving to fill the political and military vacuum that had emerged in the Middle East.
\nRussia aimed to use its presence in the region as a pressure card in dealing with the Ukrainian crisis, the annexation of Crimea, the missile defense shield, and the eastward expansion of NATO.
\nAs mentioned earlier, American hesitation in certain arms deals contributed to Russia\u2019s growing influence in the Middle East and its restoration of global stature through the formation of regional and international alliances. Moscow signed arms deals worth tens of billions of dollars with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Sultanate of Oman, Kuwait, Algeria, and the Arab Republic of Egypt.
\nDespite the financial significance of these deals, the main goal was to expand Russian influence. With the acquisition of new weapons, the importing countries would require military training and Russian experts, leading to significant adjustments in their military doctrines to align more closely with that of the Russian army.
\nMoreover, stability in the Middle East means stability along Russia\u2019s southern borders and helps Moscow overcome the international isolation imposed on it after the war with Ukraine.
\nThis was confirmed by the Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, Dmitry Shugayev, in his statement in November 2019 during an exhibition held in Dubai. He declared that “Russia exports more than two billion dollars\u2019 worth of arms annually to the region, maintaining a stable share of 10% to 20%, while its military exports to Africa have reached 40%”. He also noted that the United Arab Emirates had requested to conduct tests of the Russian unmanned aerial vehicle \u201cOrion-A\u201d on its territory. The drone can carry two small bombs, has a *payload capacity of up to 200 kilograms, a wingspan of 16 meters, a length of 8 meters, and a speed ranging between 120 and 200 km\/h. It can reach an altitude of 7,500 meters, operate at a range of up to 300 kilometers, and sustain flight duration of 24 hours.
\nFor President Vladimir Putin, this represents an existential struggle with the United States of America, and the Middle East is the arena where he finds the leverage to assert this rivalry. Prior to the Russia\u2013Ukraine crisis, the Middle East and North Africa had already emerged as the second-largest market for Russian arms, with Russia ranking second only to the United States in global arms exports. The Russian defensive presence in the Middle East rests on three main pillars: Arms sales, training on their use, and access to military bases and the deployment of paramilitary forces.
\nAlthough the Russian Federal Commission for Military Cooperation confirmed in 2021 that military exports to the Middle East had reached approximately 6 billion dollars over the past 5 years, representing between 40% and 50% of its total military exports, Algeria has been supplied with its most powerful and advanced defense systems, such as the Sukhoi Su-57 fighter jet.
\nHowever, these exports have faced a decline and some difficulties since the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. India, one of the largest importers of Russian weapons, has significantly reduced its imports. One reason may be the poor performance of some of these weapons during the Russian war with Ukraine, particularly tanks and armored vehicles. Nonetheless, Russian air defense systems have proven successful and have maintained a presence in the arms market. Another reason for this decline is the sanctions imposed on arms manufacturers with close ties to the Russian military. As a result, these companies, particularly helicopter manufacturers, have visited Saudi Arabia, followed by Russian President Putin’s visit to the United Arab Emirates, Russia’s main trading partner in the Arab world. Algeria also conducted a military dialogue with Russia at the end of 2023.
\nThe Ukraine crisis has also weighed heavily on Rosoboronexport, a state-owned Russian arms manufacturer, which has sought to repatriate weapons it had exported to other countries to replenish its own stockpile of weapons used in Ukraine, particularly from Egypt. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi had approved the delivery of approximately 150 engines and the shipment of 40,000 missiles, but the deal has stalled due to US pressure.
\nIn return, Russia seeks to consolidate its military alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a US official from the National Security Council declared that \u201cRussia is providing Iran with an unprecedented level of military and technical support, including fighter jets and Sukhoi Su-35 helicopters.\u201d
\nThis could also pose a threat to the Gulf States; in addition to Russian-Iranian-Chinese military exercises and maneuvers in late 2019. Iranian Brigadier General Allam Reza stated, “Relations between the three countries have reached a beneficial level.” This was also confirmed by the Russian Foreign Minister in 2023 when he confirmed progress in the Russian-Iranian treaty on a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”
\nRussia also seeks to obtain the right to dock at a naval base in eastern Libya, which would enhance its strategic and logistic capabilities. It also seeks to establish a naval base in Sudan with the aim of permanent access to the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Peninsula.
\nIn contrast to this Russian expansion, China has emerged as the world’s third-largest arms exporter, having surpassed Germany and France. It exports to more than 35 countries, including 18 African nations. It constantly seeks to bolster its position as an arms exporter by offering incentives to importing countries, which have demonstrated interest, evidenced by contracts concluded with the State-owned China North Industrial Group Corporation (CNIGC). These contracts include deals for the unmanned Skysaker drone, the CR500 helicopter, the Dragons Cruise aircraft, and the HR short-range air defense system. According to statements by S\u00f2ng Zh\u014dngp\u00edng, China is ready to sell high-tech weapons to friendly countries without conditions. China is seeking to expand its military sales market, exploring new markets such as Oceania, a large geographic region that includes Australia and others.
\nWith an area of \u200b\u200b8,525,989 km2, it boasts a diverse mix of highly developed and competitive economies and financial markets. China also focuses on medium-sized economies in the Pacific Islands. Oceania extends from the Strait of Malacca to the coast of the Asian continent. The importance of this strait lies in its role as the primary conduit for supplying oil to both China and Japan, two of the world’s largest consumers of this commodity.
\nAsia and Oceania accounted for 74% of Chinese arms imports, 6% for Africa, and 7% for the Middle East. Pakistan is the largest importer after the United States halted military aid to Islamabad. While China previously imported over 75% of its equipment from Russia, particularly C-435 fighters and surface-to-air missiles, as well as fighter jet systems and engines, Chinese arms manufacturers now rank among the top 25 companies in the world, as follows: Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) ranks sixth globally, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CEIC) ranks eighth, and Norinco ranks ninth, among others.
\nThe Sales of the mentioned companies also increased by 5% at the beginning of 2020; however, despite the expansion of the Chinese geopolitical system, Chinese companies still have limited clients in the markets of North America and Western Europe, and the presence of Chinese companies in these regions is a quest to obtain Western expertise.
\nFurthermore, the trade of these companies is affiliated with the government. Therefore, despite the Israeli media claim that the IDF had discovered a large quantity of Chinese weapons used by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Caris Wen, CEO of the Signal Group and an expert on Chinese-Israeli relations, confirmed that these weapons were not imported directly from China, which does not sell weapons to non-governmental entities.
\nThrough arms trade, Beijing realizes that weapons are a strategic commodity linked to the state, and that armies will need technical support, spare parts, and more ammunition, thus ensuring dependency.
\nIn response to this competition, Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in 2017, which aims to impose sanctions on US adversaries such as North Korea, Iran, states that produce weapons of mass destruction, and Iran’s ballistic missile programs. The law prohibits the use or transfer of military equipment, or the provision of technical or financial assistance that contributes to Iran’s arms buildup. The law was applied to China in September 2018, imposing sanctions on the Equipment Development Department of the Chinese Ministry of Defense.
\nAmid these pressures and growing competition, China has begun seeking to expand its presence in Africa. In the context of strategic rivalry and ongoing efforts by major powers to showcase their strength\u2014particularly in the defense industry\u2014these nations aim to increase their exports, thereby boosting their national income. In addition, they seek to enhance their influence by sending forces to train soldiers and establishing military bases.
\nFollowing Africa\u2019s move to free itself from French dependency, and in light of the sanctions imposed on Russia, as well as the continent\u2019s absence from the list of U.S. priorities for arms exports, China found an opportunity to penetrate the African market and, consequently, assert its influence.
\nConsequently, China emerged as the second largest arms supplier to sub-Saharan Africa after Russia, accounting for 30% of the region’s imports, ahead of France with 7.7%. Chinese arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa amounted to $205 billion, or about 22% of total exports for 2023, which amounted to $932 billion. In contrast, Russian arms sales accounted for 24% of total exports to sub-Saharan Africa, while US sales to the region accounted for 5%.
\nHere arises a question: What distinguishes Chinese weaponry, allowing it to compete with Russian and American arms?
\nChinese weapons are characterized by their affordability and the lack of burdensome political or economic conditions imposed on importing countries. Across the African continent, China sells more advanced and sophisticated weapons, and the purchase of these arms is directly linked to intensifying operations against rebels in certain African states.
\nThis export activity has increased following the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with more than 60% of China\u2019s arms exports directed toward sub-Saharan Africa. The distribution is as follows: Tanzania receives 20%, Nigeria 13.5%, Sudan 12.7%, Cameroon 11.3%, and Zambia 6.4%.
\nThese arms-importing countries constitute China’s largest investment and construction projects, further strengthening the link between Chinese economic interests and security concerns. For example, Nigeria has been one of the most significant importers of Chinese weapons, attracting more than 14% of Chinese investment and construction projects. However, it has recently experienced security challenges such as Boko Haram attacks and armed robbery, prompting China to protect its interests.
\nAs for the North African countries, they have contracts concluded with China, which are being implemented by the China North Industrial Group Corporation (CNIGC). These contracts include unmanned Skysaker, CR500 helicopters, Dragon5 cruise aircraft, and the HR short-range air defense system.
\nFor its part, Norinco\u2014 China’s largest arms producer and the world’s seventh-largest supplier of military equipment\u2014 opened a new office in Senegal in 2023. Located in southwest Africa, this country is experiencing a regional crisis after the three countries\u2014Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso\u2014 created the Sahel Confederation, which seeks to secure Russia’s interests in the region. The opening of Norinco’s office represents an advance and expansion of the Chinese influence in West Africa, and a challenge to the French and Russian influence.
\nWith France\u2019s influence in Africa declining and sanctions imposed on Russia, China has found itself expanding its presence. As of February 2023, it had become one of the top ten military and police contributors to three missions in Africa: the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, where it deployed 1,031 soldiers along with 18 officers and experts; the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; and the United Nations Mission for Peacekeeping in Mali.
\nIn addition, China has provided logistical support to the African Union Mission in Somalia. The total number of Chinese troops participating in Peacekeeping Forces has exceeded 2,250 soldiers. Moreover, the number of Chinese military attach\u00e9s increased from 10 to 27 in 2023, accompanied by a rise in Chinese naval visits to ports in C\u00f4te d\u2019Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, and Cameroon.
\nMore importantly, China has invested heavily in military education, with the Chinese army training around 2,000 African military officers each year. Between 2018 and 2022, over 2,000 African police officers and law enforcement personnel received training in the People\u2019s Armed Police academies.
\nChina also offers nearly 100,000 scholarships, with military education accounting for about 4% to 7% of them. The educational system of the People\u2019s Liberation Army covers more than five professional career tracks.
\nThe Chinese Army Command College in Beijing has become particularly popular among African nations. Ten African presidents and eight defense ministers are among its graduates \u2014 including former President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Laurent Kabila, and current leaders such as Eritrea\u2019s President Isaias Afwerki and Zimbabwe\u2019s President Emmerson Mnangagwa.
\nTo further strengthen African security, the China\u2013Africa Defense and Security Forum was held in Beijing in 2018, bringing together China and representatives from 50 African countries. The forum led to the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF), along with programs focused on maintaining security, combating piracy, and countering terrorism.
\nDuring the forum, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the allocation of military aid to the African Union, in addition to more than $320 million to support the development of the Joint Force of the (G5 du Sahel), which was founded in 2017 under a UN initiative and includes Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.
\nChina also has its only military base in Africa, in Djibouti; established as a result of a joint project between the two countries under a defense and security treaty, aiming to train Djibouti’s armed forces. The base is located in the port of Oyok and overlooks Tabora Bay. It was the first time China had sent troops outside the country to carry out peacekeeping missions and protect Chinese citizens and interests in Africa. The base is located 13 to 14 km from the US Limonia Base.
\nChina\u2019s military presence in Africa has become increasingly evident in various forms. It began with activities at the port of Bata in Equatorial Guinea, which \u2014 according to U.S. claims \u2014 has been transformed into a Chinese naval base. In addition, the role of Chinese private security companies in Africa has grown significantly, including firms such as PSC, HXZA, FSC, OSG, and DeWe. Their operations range from protecting personnel and fleets to even transporting weapons \u2014 despite the fact that Chinese law prohibits private security companies from using firearms.
\nWhat are the objectives of China\u2019s military and security presence in Africa?
\nProtecting Chinese citizens, workers, and investors:
\nChina has over 10,000 companies and more than one million nationals operating across Africa. Incidents of kidnapping, piracy, and extortion targeting Chinese nationals \u2014 particularly in Nigeria and Guinea \u2014 have resulted in losses exceeding $20 billion.
\nSafeguarding its economic interests:
\nChina\u2019s focus is on securing access to vital and natural resources, as oil and minerals account for around 84% of its imports from Africa.
\nSecuring international trade routes and maritime navigation:
\nAfrica borders some of the world\u2019s most strategic waterways, including the Indian Ocean, Atlantic Ocean, and key chokepoints such as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Mozambique Channel, and the Gulf of Guinea.
\nIsolating Taiwan diplomatically:
\nChina seeks to prevent any African nation from recognizing Taiwan.
\nExpanding Chinese arms sales in the region:
\nChina\u2019s military exports have grown significantly in Nigeria and Ghana\u2014the largest importers of Chinese weapons in West Africa\u2014alongside Cameroon and Chad.
\nLinking arms sales with access to natural resources; particularly in oil and minerals.
\nDeepening ties with African nations diplomatically:
\nAfrica\u2019s voting bloc within the United Nations holds great significance for China, which may rely on African support in its global economic competition.
\nBeyond its growing dominance in Africa, the competition among major powers has also expanded to Georgia \u2014 a country strategically positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, and the only South Caucasus nation with access to the oceans.
\nGeorgia has become a key hub for alternative energy supply routes designed to bypass Russia, extending from Central Asia across the Caspian Sea to Europe. This westward shift has accelerated the nation\u2019s development and attracted foreign investment.
\nOver the past decade, Georgia has pursued a pragmatic, multi-dimensional policy \u2014 seeking to avoid hostility with Russia, and maintain relations with the European Union, and open its doors to Chinese influence at the same time. Consequently, its site and policies have become a focal point of conflict, contributing to a state of political ambiguity and domestic instability. As a result, Georgia increased its international partnerships and, since 2013, it has been among the priority countries in the Belt and Road Initiative. Investments from China have since flowed into Georgia, with a free trade agreement signed between the two countries in 2017, and visa requirements were abolished in 2024. Furthermore, Georgia granted China the right to build a port on the Black Sea coast \u2014 a move that provoked anger in both Washington and Moscow.
\nAmid this rivalry, Georgia sought to abandon its hostile rhetoric toward Russia, refraining from imposing sanctions and continuing to benefit from economic relations with Moscow. It also provided no assistance to Ukrainians except for hosting refugees who fled to its territory. In return, Russia lifted restrictions on Georgian imports in 2013, abolished the visa requirements for Georgian citizens, and lifted the ban on direct flights in 2023.
\nHence, war has become a necessity for major powers \u2014 both to dominate regions rich in natural resources and to find markets for their arms industries. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the world\u2019s top five arms exporters between 2014 and 2018 were, respectively: the United States, Russia, France, Germany, and China. The Middle East accounted for 52% of U.S. arms exports, while Russian arms sales to Middle Eastern countries increased by 19% between 2015 and 2019.
\nGreat power competition has accelerated in the wake of the Russo-Ukrainian War, and the new world order includes three great powers: Russia, China, and the United States. The Russo-Ukrainian War represents a new global upheaval since the Cold War, serving as a real-life experiment in great power warfare. China and Russia issued a joint statement declaring that their partnership was greater than a traditional alliance and that their friendship would know no boundaries.
\nIn fact, the Russia-US dispute has had a negative impact on both countries. Trade relations between the two countries collapsed between 2013 and 2024, and have continued to decline since 2022, during the presidency of Joe Biden. Total US trade in goods with Russia was estimated at only $3.5 billion, compared to $11.1 billion during Barack Obama’s presidency. Mutual investments increased in 2019, with a large number of US companies investing in the Russian market, estimated at approximately $14.17 billion in 2019, while they declined to $7.67 billion in 2023.
\nThe Russian economy has benefited greatly from the presence of American companies, providing jobs for more than 410,000 people in 2021 and generating annual revenues of $12.2 billion in 2021, compared to $7.67 billion in 2023. In return, Russia has extensive options within the United States through private investment funds, and Russian foreign investment in the United States rose to $13.3 billion in 2022.
\nThe Russian-American rivalry has had profoundly negative effects, primarily through the imposition of Western sanctions on the Russian economy since 2014 under the pretext of the Russia-Ukraine war. These sanctions have hindered Russia\u2019s ability to borrow from foreign financial markets and limited its access to Western investments and modern technologies. Moreover, more than a thousand international companies have withdrawn from the Russian market, leading to negative growth rates since the second quarter of 2022. Although growth rates improved up to the first quarter of 2024, they began to decline again in the third quarter of 2024, dropping from 5.4% to 3.1%. Subsequently, the European Union imposed additional sanctions on the Russian economy.
\nAll of this has prompted Russia to accelerate negotiations with the United States, which appear to be on a path toward success. Russia\u2019s motivation lies in its desire to ease sanctions, especially since they target vital sectors such as military trade and the Russian military-industrial complex, with more than 53 entities added to the sanctions list. The banking sector has also been affected, as restrictions were imposed on transactions involving credit or financial institutions established outside Russia that use the 5pf5 message transfer system of the Russian Central Bank, in addition to other economically significant sectors.
\nThe restoration of relations between Russia and the United States is expected to lead to faster and more sustainable economic growth and to compensate for the losses resulting from European sanctions. On the other hand, American companies have lost more than 300 billion dollars due to their withdrawal from the Russian market. The U.S. economy has also been negatively affected by the severance of relations with Russia, which is the world\u2019s largest supplier of low-cost fertilizers. As a result, inflation has increased in agricultural and food commodity prices, as well as in energy prices, leading to a rise in overall inflation rates in the United States. The Federal Reserve has been unable to achieve its targeted interest rate of 2%, with inflation reaching 3% in January 2025. Additionally, the United States imports about 8% of its crude oil and related product needs from Russia.
\nGiven this economic significance, both nations are striving to restore their relations \u2014 particularly in terms of economic cooperation. This effort has become evident through negotiations held in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia between the Russian envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, Chief Investment Director at the Kremlin, and the U.S. envoy, Steve Mnuchin. The talks aim to remove artificial barriers hindering the development of economic cooperation, with expectations that some American companies will return to the Russian market. Moreover, former President Trump is seeking a peace agreement concerning the Russia\u2013Ukraine war, which indicates that capital flows between the two countries are likely to increase.
\nIn reality, global trade has suffered significantly in recent years due to the Russia\u2013Ukraine war. Russia occupies a major position in global economic integration, being the primary supplier of natural gas and various minerals such as titanium, aluminum, and nickel, among others. When its export share declined as a result of global economic sanctions\u2014from 29.1% in 2021 to 23.1% in 2023\u2014global prices surged.
\nWith the end of the Russia\u2013Ukraine war, Russian global trade and exports across various supply chains are expected to recover, positively impacting the economies of developing nations. Additionally, Russia has withdrawn its support for the BRICS common currency, and it is likely that the 2025 BRICS Summit will decide to conduct transactions in local currencies instead.
\nThe Cold War environment was characterized by a fierce conflict between two ideologically different poles within a process of polarizing the world’s countries under the theory that every advance toward the opponent was tantamount to gaining strategic depth, while simultaneously providing a definite ability to encircle the opposing pole. The fall of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of regions on the international scene, with Central Asia being geographically located at the heart of the world, and whoever controls it controls the world. It is a geographical and strategic bridge between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Russia asserts that one of its most important foreign policy priorities is enabling integration with the former Soviet republics. The Russian-Chinese political and economic alliance also created a favorable environment for a struggle for influence.
\nChina seeks to assert control over Taiwan and secure energy sources to sustain its powerful economy, yet it feels that the United States is working to contain and challenge it. The U.S. has surrounded China with a network of military bases across Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, and Thailand \u2014 a strategic encirclement that limits China\u2019s naval power. Nearly 70% of China\u2019s energy supplies pass through the Strait of Malacca, and if the U.S. were to block it, China\u2019s economy would come to a standstill.
\nChina lacks its own significant energy resources, while Russia possesses vast reserves, especially in its Asian territories. However, Russia\u2019s eastern regions suffer from a shortage of labor and capital and lag behind its western part in development.
\nThus, with China\u2019s available capital and abundant workforce, it can exploit the resources of eastern Russia. Through oil and gas pipelines, China could shield itself from the American threat of a blockade in the Strait of Malacca. Hence, the growing Sino-Russian partnership represents a strategic and mutually beneficial necessity.
\nThis alliance and cooperation are, in fact, indispensable. A look back into history reveals that Russia and China have long experienced fierce struggles for dominance in East Asia, dating back to the Mongol invasion of Russia and extending into the 20th century through conflicts such as the Russo-Japanese War (1905\u20131945). China also endured violent confrontations with European powers \u2014 between 1839 and 1949, it was effectively partitioned between Britain and Japan, suffering from humiliation and decline until the victory of the Communist Revolution.
\nFurthermore, during the Opium War of 1858, China was mired in a devastating civil conflict that claimed millions of lives. Russia seized the opportunity, amassing tens of thousands of troops along the Chinese border and demanding sovereignty over Outer Manchuria. Unable to open another front, China ceded the territory to Russia through the 1860 treaty. That region now includes key parts of eastern Russia, such as Khabarovsk and Vladivostok \u2014 the latter being Russia\u2019s largest port on the Pacific Ocean. Without Vladivostok, Russia\u2019s nuclear naval power in the Far East would not have held significant weight.
\nThis treaty deprived China of its coastline along the Sea of Japan, leaving it only with access to the East and South China Seas \u2014 had it not been for this, the Sea of Japan might today have been under Chinese sovereignty. In 1986, conflict between the two nations flared up once again along the rivers forming their mutual border. Russia claimed that the boundary lay along the Russian banks of the rivers, while China countered that the islands within the rivers belonged to it and that the true border should be drawn along the midline of the waterways. The dispute escalated into armed clashes, prompting Russia to threaten the use of nuclear weapons.
\nAlthough the confrontation formally ended in 1991 with the demarcation of borders between the two countries, this resolution did not mean that the underlying tensions were permanently laid to rest.
\nWith the collapse of the Soviet Union, China quickly moved to establish strong ties with the newly independent states that emerged, aiming to integrate them into its vision for the Silk Road initiative. Central Asia holds great strategic importance for China as a vital source of energy, ensuring a steady flow of natural gas through pipelines from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan \u2014 supplying more than 15% of China\u2019s natural gas needs and bypassing the Strait of Malacca.
\nTo put this in perspective, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are Russia\u2019s competitors in exporting gas to China, which has now become the largest market for Russian gas following the imposition of European sanctions. Consequently, China has surpassed Russia in trade dealings with Central Asian countries. Both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have also refused to join the Eurasian Alliance \u2014 Russia\u2019s proposed framework intended to rival the European Union.
\nThis growing alliance between China and the Central Asian nations has become a significant obstacle to Russia\u2019s long-standing ambition to maintain dominance over the region. Central Asia represents Russia\u2019s \u201csoft underbelly,\u201d a gateway to the vast Eurasian plain \u2014 a historic invasion route into Russian territory. China, capitalizing on Russia\u2019s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine and its confrontation with NATO, has extended its influence over Central Asia. Yet, a crucial question remains: how long will Russia remain silent in the face of China\u2019s expanding reach?
\nIn addition to its lack of energy resources, China also suffers from a severe water shortage. Although it is home to 20% of the world\u2019s population, it possesses only 7% of the planet\u2019s freshwater resources. Moreover, 80% of China\u2019s limited water supply is concentrated in the southern regions \u2014 areas with relatively low population density \u2014 while the north, which holds the highest concentration of people, has significantly less access to water. Nearly 400 million people live in northern China, where water must be transported through pipelines.
\nClimate change and rising global temperatures have further worsened China\u2019s crisis. In 2022, a devastating drought struck the country, drying up the Yangtze River Basin \u2014 China\u2019s largest and most vital water source, located in the southern Himalayas region.
\nThe water-scarce north lies close to Russia, which possesses one of the world\u2019s greatest untapped freshwater reserves: Lake Baikal. This vast lake contains roughly one-quarter of the world\u2019s surface freshwater \u2014 enough to supply global needs for over fifty years. Chinese companies have sought to purchase land near the lake, and in 2017 China announced plans to build water pipelines connecting the lake to its territory. However, Russia firmly opposed the project, viewing it as a strategic threat to its natural resources.
\nWhat compels China and Russia to maintain their alliance is the existence of a common adversary. The United States and its allies encircle China from the east and south, just as they surround Russia from the west. Were it not for this shared external pressure, the old tensions between Moscow and Beijing might have resurfaced long ago.
\nChina, in fact, admires President Putin\u2019s defiance of the United States and Europe. It benefits greatly from purchasing Russian oil resources at discounted prices and from expanding its trade links with Central Asia \u2014 all while the U.S. remains distracted from the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, a crucial question lingers: if the Russian leadership were to change, would China seek to assert itself and reclaim the territories once taken by Russia?
\nAs an old Arab proverb says: \u201cWhen the snow melts, the grass will show.\u201d But in this case, the melting of the Arctic snow due to global warming has revealed not green pastures \u2014 but a new arena of global competition among Russia, the United States, and China.
\nBut what is this competition about?
\nIn fact, the Arctic is the highest region on Earth, overlooked by Norway and Denmark from Europe, Russia from Asia, and Canada and America from North America. Sweden, Finland, and Iceland also own territories within it, which they administer through an Arctic Council, which China joined as an observer member in 2013.
\nAs frozen seas turn into liquids, navigation between China and the United States could be cut by a full week, potentially transforming the Suez Canal into a shipping route between Asia and Europe, saving hundreds of thousands of dollars. According to 2009 data from the U.S. Geological Survey, the region also contains approximately 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas reserves and 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves.
\nThe reserves are estimated at about a trillion dollars. Russia, America, and China all realize that the hope of future generations will depend on each country’s ability to secure its interests there. However, Russia still holds the upper hand there, having outpaced everyone else since planting its flag at the bottom of the pole in 2007. It has extracted approximately 25% of its gas production and 20% of its oil from it, and has invested economically and militarily by establishing military bases and building fifty giant icebreakers, including eleven nuclear-powered icebreakers, as well as deploying thousands of emplacements and radars.
\nRussia also sought to attract foreign investment to the Arctic, with Russian President Vladimir Putin stating that he wanted to connect the Northern Sea Route to China’s Silk Road trade route. China declared itself a sub-Arctic nation, arguing that all stakeholders should participate in its management, not just the countries that own territories there. This annoyed Russia, but it nevertheless encouraged it, recognizing that China was pursuing private projects rather than profitable investments. It spent $90 billion between 2012 and 2017 in preparation for 2030, when it is expected that all the ice will melt, leaving the region open to navigation without the need for Russian icebreakers or their oversight.
\nAccording to a Wall Street Journal report, this Russian-Chinese expansion worries America. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that although his country has lagged behind in establishing its influence in the Arctic, it is capable of making up for that. Indeed, it reinforced its military presence in mid-2020 by sending a squadron of F-35 aircraft, which, according to The National Interest, could serve as a deterrent to any Russian or Chinese incursion. Nevertheless, there remains the possibility of a climate miracle that would halt the rise in temperature and the melting of the ice until 2030, halting the ambitions of major powers because without this melting, investment would be too costly.
\nConfirming U.S. concerns over China\u2019s growing global influence, the 2022 National Security Strategy\u2014a document issued every five years by the American administration to outline its global defense and strategic priorities\u2014explicitly identified China as the sole competitor possessing both the intent and the capability to reshape the international order. The report emphasized that China wields the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological resources necessary to pursue this goal. According to the document, the United States would need a decade to effectively counter China\u2019s rise \u2014 a decade that will determine Washington\u2019s future standing on the global stage. In essence, China has been officially classified as America\u2019s primary rival.
\nAt the same time, Russia too harbors deep apprehensions about China\u2019s expansion. Economically, the disparity between the two nations has become stark. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China\u2019s economic growth has outpaced Russia\u2019s by a factor of ten. While China recorded a trade surplus of $676 billion, Russia\u2019s stood at only $197.3 billion. The IMF also projects that China\u2019s GDP will reach $30 trillion by 2027, whereas Russia\u2019s will remain below $1 trillion. Therefore, the imbalance has strained the foundations of their partnership. In 2021, Beijing accounted for 18% of Russia\u2019s total trade, making it Moscow\u2019s largest trading partner. Conversely, Russia represented only 2% of China\u2019s trade volume\u2014a gap that has continued to widen due to the ongoing Russia\u2013Ukraine war.
\nChina, while maintaining its ties with President Putin, has skillfully navigated the geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe, ensuring that its relations with Europe remain intact and beneficial. As Russia\u2019s economy faltered under sanctions, China filled the vacuum left by departing Western companies, strengthening its foothold in the Russian market.
\nDespite the overall stagnation of Russian trade amid the war, bilateral trade in goods between Russia and China surged to $17.2 billion in the early months of the conflict\u2014an increase of 13.2%, with energy resources comprising about 70% of this exchange. However, this reliance is now at risk. China has begun taking strategic steps to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, moving instead toward renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power, in line with its long-term goal of lowering carbon emissions.
\nThe relationship between Russia and China is extremely delicate. Both nations share common interests on certain fronts, yet each holds non-negotiable priorities\u2014making their partnership distinct from traditional international alliances. What differentiates them most is their global presence. China has emerged as a rising power with expanding economic influence, while Russia maintains primarily military and security expertise but with limited economic weight.
\nAlthough Beijing\u2019s growing role may gradually diminish Russia\u2019s influence in Central Asia and the Middle East, Moscow remains preoccupied with its war in Ukraine\u2014aimed at preventing NATO\u2019s advance toward its borders. Meanwhile, China continues to expand and consolidate its power, recently extending its reach beyond economic cooperation by providing military support to Kazakhstan, a nation long regarded by Russia as part of its historical sphere of influence.
\nThrough this move, China has effectively crossed a strategic threshold\u2014transforming its engagement in the region from purely economic collaboration to direct military involvement.
\nRussia has sought to emulate China\u2019s economic model through the launch of the Meridian Highway Project, also known domestically as the Russian Silk Road. This $9 billion project spans nearly 2,000 kilometers, extending from the Russian-Kazakh border to Belarus. It is envisioned as an integral segment of a broader international transport corridor linking Europe and western China. The project aims to strengthen Russia\u2019s economic and political ties with its traditional spheres of influence. However, it also serves as a direct competitor to China\u2019s Belt and Road Initiative \u2014 even though its realization remains uncertain due to the ongoing sanctions imposed on Russia.
\nThe strategic rivalry between the two powers has intensified to the point of military competition. China recently conducted joint military exercises with Tajikistan, prompting Russia to respond with similar maneuvers on Tajikistan\u2019s border with Afghanistan, citing the pretext of countering the infiltration of Islamist fighters from former Soviet republics in Central Asia. However, this was a clear message to Beijing that Russia will not tolerate Chinese interference in the former Soviet states, which it continues to regard as its own geopolitical backyard.
\nChina cannot afford to overlook the strategic importance of Central Asia. With its rapidly growing economy and expanding population, Beijing inevitably turned its attention to the region\u2019s vast reserves of oil, gas, and minerals. Central Asia holds an estimated 40 billion barrels of oil and more than 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Taking advantage of Russia\u2019s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine and its economic limitations, China \u2014 with its formidable $4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves and advanced technological capabilities \u2014 has positioned itself as the largest direct investor in the region.
\nBeijing also has begun laying the groundwork for a security presence in Central Asia. During his visit to Kazakhstan, President Xi Jinping pledged to safeguard the country\u2019s independence following signs of tension between Kazakhstan and Russia due to Kazakhstan\u2019s neutral stance on the Ukraine war. This declaration was a subtle yet unmistakable warning to Russia.
\nAs China continues to advance technologically, it has begun to reduce its dependence on Russian military technology. The once-strong reliance on importing Russian weapons has steadily declined since Beijing launched a long-term program to capitalize on its own progress in missile systems, nuclear capabilities, and artificial intelligence \u2014 a development that now alarms both the United States and Russia. For Russia, this trend poses a serious economic and strategic concern. Russia fears not only the decline in its arms exports to China, but also the possibility that Beijing\u2019s defense innovations could target Central Asian countries \u2014 nations that have long been major importers of Russian weaponry. Such a shift would undermine one of Russia\u2019s last remaining instruments of influence in the region.
\nThis fear is magnified by Russia\u2019s experience in the Middle East, where it has worked to consolidate its presence through the establishment of several naval and ground bases and by intervening militarily in the Syrian war in defense of its allies. In contrast, Washington\u2019s withdrawal from its traditional Arab partners after the Arab Spring \u2014 most notably its abandonment of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt \u2014 sent shockwaves across the Arab world.
\nIn addition to Syria, Moscow has sought to forge close ties with the Gulf states; primarily with Saudi Arabia through joint coordination to regulate oil markets and consensus on several political issues. Moscow also sought to forge close ties with the United Arab Emirates, through unprecedented trade and investment growth, which has become a safe haven for Russian oligarchs fleeing Western sanctions. Moscow also reached an understanding with Qatar that neither side would encroach on the other’s share in order to protect their traditional exports. Moscow has also resumed supplying the Egyptian army with weapons and economic projects in the Suez Canal region, and built the country’s first nuclear reactor in Dabaa on the Mediterranean coast.
\nChina, in turn, has become a major trading partner for all Arab countries, surpassing America economically in its traditional Gulf region of influence, and becoming the largest importer of Arab oil. It also maintains good relations with all the conflicting parties: Palestine, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, leading to its mediation, under which relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran were resumed for the first time since 2016.
\nFor more than ten years, Russia has sought to involve China in the reconstruction of Syria, as well as in the oil sector. Before the start of the Syrian civil war, China was one of the largest investors in the Syrian oil industry. Trade between the two countries before 2010; i.e. before the war, amounted to approximately $248 billion. Approximately thirty Chinese companies operated in Syria, and China ranked first among Syria’s trading partners, accounting for 63% of Russian trade.
\nChina and Russia stand as friends and allies on one front \u2014 united against their shared rival, the United States \u2014 yet on another, they are competitors, each seeking to extend its influence across the Middle East, the former Soviet republics, the Arctic region, and Africa.
\nBoth powers pursue their own strategic interests, each recognizing the necessity of partnership, yet neither forgetting the historical rivalries and wounds that time has not erased. In this context, war becomes the ultimate instrument for asserting dominance, reshaping global power structures, and subduing nations \u2014 all while opening new markets for the global arms trade.
\nIn conclusion:
\nThe ongoing struggle for control over markets, trade routes, and mineral resources clearly illustrates that a confrontation is inevitable. What is unfolding today in Central Asia \u2014 particularly in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan \u2014 signals the beginning of a new geopolitical contest.
\nIn 2023, US President Joe Biden held the first-ever meeting with the heads of the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) to find alternative corridors after the Russian-Ukrainian war, in order to diversify trade ties and economic resilience through the Central Asia Corridor. There was also the meeting between the Chinese President and the leaders of the Central Asian countries in 2024 to resume work on the Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan. There was also the meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kazakh President at the Astana Summit, where Russia was the security guarantor for the Central Asian countries. Moscow’s extensive military presence in Kyrgyzstan and the remittances of Asian migrants from Russia, which constitute nearly 30% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP alone, were also discussed.
\nIn addition to the Arab and Asian regional cooperation and the extensive Turkish presence in the Central Asian region, especially in trade between the two sides, where the volume of trade between Turkey and Kazakhstan reached 4.7%, Tajikistan 5.3%, and Kyrgyzstan 6.4%, and the Indian-Asian meeting, the Delhi Summit, which upset India’s traditional ally when India proposed a project to facilitate the services of the “Shahid Beheshti Terminal” in the port of Chabahar in the Islamic Republic of Iran to link Central Asia with India, and the meeting between the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, and the President of Kyrgyzstan, Sadyr Japarov. The summit was also attended by the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
\nBut ultimately, the most serious question is: Why, after all these alignments and alliances, did the project fail? It almost changed the face of the world by sparking a devastating direct war between Turkey and Iran on Syrian soil, and who was harmed by the project’s failure?
\nAre Turkey and Iran non-sectarian peoples and nations, and is sectarianism limited to rogue nations?
\nWhy did the agreement with Russia become inevitable after the failure to ignite a Turkish-Iranian war along the lines of the Iraqi-Iranian one?
\nAnd, who wants to win over Iran and to whose benefit after the failure of the Syrian-Israeli security agreement?
\nAlso, why have the Balkan, Greek, and Cypriot issues once again resurfaced in Turkey’s historically present situation?
\nWhy are those crowds in Greece from Britain, Israel, America, and elsewhere, and who is watching them there?
\nWhy is U.S. President Donald Trump threatening to raise customs tariffs by 100% on anyone importing Russian oil and gas, while at the same time American companies are returning to the heart of Moscow?
\nDoes India\u2019s and China\u2019s approval to resolve the border dispute at this particular time mean the withdrawal of a regional card from American hands \u2014 or is it with U.S. blessing in pursuit of a settlement with China?
\nWhat is the connection between Ukraine and the Gaza war? Why doesn’t the war in Ukraine stop? Who benefits from it?
\nIf the Ukraine war were to end, would European attention turn toward supporting the independence of a Palestinian state?
\nFinally, why is Iran displacing Afghans \u2014 and what is their link to the recent war with Israel? And what is the fate of the Pakistani-Saudi-Egyptian military alliance?<\/p>\n

Khaled Zein Eddine
\nEditor-in-Chief of the European Arab International Newspaper
\nMember of the International Federation of Journalists in Brussels
\nMember of the Journalists\u2019 Union in Poland","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"

Between alliance and rivalry lies a secret key revealed by interests and the equations of supply and demand. They are driven by the forces that shape consumption and production, and by a relentless race for abundant resources and the search for alternatives\u2014energy, water, and more. Added to this is the growing demand for weapons, accompanied …<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":29,"featured_media":45391,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"footnotes":""},"categories":[30],"tags":[3228],"class_list":["post-45390","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-30","tag-the-two-frenemies-china-and-russia"],"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/euroarab-int.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45390","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/euroarab-int.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/euroarab-int.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/euroarab-int.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/users\/29"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/euroarab-int.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcomments&post=45390"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/euroarab-int.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45390\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":45392,"href":"https:\/\/euroarab-int.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/posts\/45390\/revisions\/45392"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/euroarab-int.com\/index.php?rest_route=\/wp\/v2\/media\/45391"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/euroarab-int.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fmedia&parent=45390"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/euroarab-int.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fcategories&post=45390"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/euroarab-int.com\/index.php?rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Ftags&post=45390"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}