The two frenemies — China and Russia

Between alliance and rivalry lies a secret key revealed by interests and the equations of supply and demand. They are driven by the forces that shape consumption and production, and by a relentless race for abundant resources and the search for alternatives—energy, water, and more. Added to this is the growing demand for weapons, accompanied by the struggle for dominance over seas, oceans, and waterways.
This is clearly reflected in the alliance between Russia and China. Were it not for the presence of their common enemy, the United States of America, you would see hordes of Chinese armies striving with determination to invade Russia, and Russian ballistic missiles lighting up the skies over Beijing.
The conflict between them is ancient, as old as time itself. Each seeks to assert its presence on the global stage and to dominate the wealth of the Middle East, Asia, and Africa, extending all the way to the Arctic Ocean.
How are Russia and China seeking to assert their political, economic, and military presence? What should the United States do in the face of this expansion to defend its interests and dominance over the entire world? And what is the true relationship between the development of the arms industry and the continuation of wars in the region?
At the outset, Russia and China each held a distinct presence and influence: the Russian Bear entered the region through the gates of weaponry, while the Chinese Dragon pierced its skies through the realm of economy. Yet soon, their competition diversified and took on many faces.
Before 2015, the Russian presence in the Middle East was scarcely noticeable, despite maintaining a military base on the Syrian coast. That base, however, remained largely inactive as Moscow awaited the downfall of former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad — and the identity of his successor. At the time, Russia was preoccupied with its war against Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea.
But suddenly, in that very year, its gaze shifted toward deeper advancement across the world — particularly in the Middle East — to safeguard and fortify its sphere of dominance. Through Syria, Russia cemented its foothold by establishing military bases in Tartus and Hmeimim, granting it access to the region’s warm waters and tempting it toward further expansion. By early 2019, the Bear’s pawprints reached Libya, through the “Bears Battalion,” extending Moscow’s shadow even farther across the southern sands.
It also strengthened its presence in the Arab Republic of Egypt through agreements in 2018, which included the sale of MiG-29 fighter jets worth $2 billion. Its ambitions did not stop there, but extended to Algeria, with which it signed a military cooperation agreement in 2020, transforming Algeria into the largest importer of Russian equipment and weapons. In 2023, Russia also signed defense and security contracts with both the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Prior to that, it concluded a major deal with Turkey in 2017 to import 9400 air defense systems worth up to $25 billion.
The arms deals did not stop there; they stretched far beyond mere sales to include the maintenance of the weapons and training in their use — ensuring that the importing nations remain under the shadow of the supplier’s influence. This dynamic has rendered most Syrian territories — with the exception of the Kurdish regions — subordinate to the dominance of Russian corporations, along with their vast wealth, particularly in oil and gas. The same holds true for Libya, and for the gold mines of Sudan. In the latter, Russia supports both sides of the conflict — the national army and the Rapid Support Forces alike. This dual engagement is not born merely of Russia’s appetite for expansion, but of its need to wage two parallel battles: one against its American adversary, and another with its uneasy ally — the Chinese dragon. So how does the confrontation between these two “friendly rivals” unfold across the Middle East?
Indeed, China’s presence in the Middle East is clear, and so is its competition with Russia. These agreements and deals have provided a gateway for China into the Arab region. In 2018, it signed a cooperation agreement with the Silk Road Fund, represented by ACWA Power, with Saudi Arabia to invest billions of dollars in renewable energy. In 2023, China and Saudi Arabia signed contracts worth more than $10 billion in the energy and petrochemical industries.
China also signed $2 billion worth agreements with Iraq, the country with the world’s largest oil reserves, in 2020 to develop oil fields. Chinese companies are also building the new administrative capital in the Arab Republic of Egypt, with investments amounting to $45 billion. In addition, China cooperates with the Islamic Republic of Iran—the Arabs’ troublesome neighbor—with which it signed a strategic partnership agreement in 2012, including $460 billion in Chinese investments in Iranian infrastructure and the oil and gas sectors.
On the military front — and despite Russia’s long-standing dominance in arms exports to the Middle East and Arab world — Beijing has surprised many through the striking presence of its NORINCO Group, particularly in the fields of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missile systems; as in 2022, Saudi Arabia purchased China’s CH-4 drone for $700 million. Also, several military cooperation agreements were signed between Beijing and Cairo in the defense industry, including the supply of Chinese aircraft to Egypt.
Amid this growing presence, competition, and the combined military and economic weight of both powers, one question arises: What is the position of the United States regarding this rivalry between China and Russia in the Arab region?!
In fact, the United States fears this new “cold rivalry” between Moscow and Beijing, for it comes at Washington’s expense, shrinking its once-unquestioned share of influence. The Arab region — long considered an American domain — is now being divided among three major powers, with Turkey and Iran also pressing for their own place at the table.
The Americans have long expressed their discontent and concern, issuing multiple warnings and messages regarding the military deals linking China, Russia, and the Arab states — as well as their growing unease over expanding geo-economic and investment influence. This tension was clearly reflected in the clash between Beijing and Washington in Iraq over reconstruction and development contracts, which ultimately ended in a form of shared division between the two sides.
Similarly, in Egypt, which once relied almost entirely on American weaponry, the country’s arsenal has now diversified to include both Russian and Chinese arms. The same pattern is seen in Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates which were once Washington’s closest allies, as USA previously held the lion’s share of influence, before the increased influence of the Chinese Dragon and the Russian Bear.
The Sino-Russian competition remains a cold and covert struggle, unlikely to turn into open conflict unless both powers are left alone in the region — without their fiercest rival, the United States. Thus, this rivalry will endure, as geopolitical shifts have intertwined interests and divided spheres of influence. Therefore, China has been driven into the arms trade by these evolving realities, while Russia, under the pressure of Western sanctions, has been pushed to pursue economic and investment ventures, creating new opportunities for its companies. In this complex contest, the United States pays the price, while the Arab nations reap the benefit — gaining diversity in both allies and sources of power.
Russia’s goal has always been and continues to be to impose its will in the region. According to General Clausewitz, a Prussian general and military historian born in 1780, one of his most important works was Vomkviege (The Art of War). One of his most important theories was: “A national army that fights for the nation shows greater determination than professional soldiers who fight only for territory. For him, war is a continuation of diplomacy by other means, as the political interests of the nation must be considered more important than military objectives. There is a strong relationship between the balance of power and political and military objectives in war.” For this philosopher, war is a form of violence aimed at coercing the opponent to impose our will. Violence is merely the means, while the ultimate goal is the imposition of will.
Consequently, and in its pursuit of dominance, Russia sought to strengthen and expand its relations with the Arab world. These relations, however, have passed through fluctuating phases of stagnation and revival, reflecting a complex interplay of political and economic factors. Between 2011 and 2020, trade relations between Russia and the Arab countries remained relatively modest — accounting for 2.1% of Russia’s total foreign trade, and only 0.8% of the Arab states’ overall foreign trade on average.
Meanwhile, the volume of Russian direct investment projects in Arab nations between 2003 and 2021 amounted to around 5% of total foreign investments in the region, while Arab investments in Russia represented merely 1% of total foreign investments within Russia.
Arab countries implemented 39 direct projects in Russia at a total cost of $3.8 billion, creating more than 12,000 jobs. The following years witnessed a boom at a rate of more than four projects per year. Arab investments were concentrated in the financial services and real estate sectors, in terms of investment costs and new jobs, accounting for between 42% and 54%, respectively.
The United Arab Emirates is among the most significant Arab investors in Russia, with 25 projects implemented by 20 companies, representing 64% of the total and 62% of the investment cost. Qatar follows with projects exceeding $1 billion in investment costs, representing 29% of the total between 2012 and 2021.
Between 2003 and 2021, Russian companies invested in 140 projects in Arab countries, with an investment cost of $64.5 billion, creating more than 34,000 job opportunities.
The year 2017 also witnessed a surge in investment volume, reaching $32.5 billion across more than ten projects, the most notable of which is the Dabaa nuclear power plant in the Arab Republic of Egypt, with an investment cost estimated at $30 billion. Russia has focused its projects on coal, oil, gas, and energy, accounting for 30% of the total and approximately 92% of the investment cost.
Geographically, Russian investments were concentrated in Egypt at 48% in terms of cost, 19% in Iraq, and 27% in Jordan. In terms of numbers, they were concentrated in the UAE at 40%, followed by Egypt at 14% and Iraq at 11%. In 2022, four Arab countries accounted for 73.1% of Arab-Russian trade, respectively: the UAE, Egypt, Morocco, and Saudi Arabia.
These four countries topped the list of the most important exporting countries to Russia, with successive percentages: 47%, 22%, 12.7%, and 7.8%. Arab exports to Russia were represented in minerals and raw materials, accounting for 54%, manufactured goods for 40% and agricultural raw materials for 4.2% in 2020.
Russian exports to Arab countries averaged $31 billion annually between 2011 and 2020. The UAE, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt accounted for the largest share, with food products accounting for 35%, manufactured goods for 26.4%, fuel for 7.6%, pearls, precious stones, and gold for 10.2%, raw materials and metals for 4.7%, and agricultural goods and raw materials for 26%.
The volume of global export credit insurance operations directed to Arab countries in the short, medium and long term has reached approximately $165 billion annually, representing approximately 8.5% of the total operations in the world, covering 20% ​​of Arab commodity imports.
This economic cooperation between Arabs and Russia has played a significant role in the increase and diversification of projects, thus creating new job opportunities in both regions. Russian investments in Arab countries have diversified, exceeding 42 projects in the oil, coal and gas sectors, providing 9,000 jobs; real estate with 6,000 jobs or more; more than 11 projects in the metals sector, providing 4,730 jobs; tourism, hotels and auto parts manufacturing, providing 8,610 jobs; and transportation and storage, providing 700 jobs, in addition to many other sectors, thus creating numerous job opportunities.
In contrast, Arab projects in Russia have played a significant role in diversifying investments and increasing employment; namely in the real estate sector, which has provided more than 7,000 jobs; in the coal, oil, and gas sectors, where 2,700 jobs have been created; in the transportation and storage sectors, more than 800 jobs have been created; in the hotel and tourism sector, 1,500 jobs have been created; and in other sectors too.
This economic cooperation and its development between the Arabs and Russia demonstrate the great importance of the Middle East’s geographical location. It is the crossroads of the ancient world’s continents and overlooks some of the most significant seas: the Caspian, the Mediterranean, the Black sea, the Red sea, the Arabian Gulf, and the Arabian Sea. Moreover, it contains some of the world’s most vital maritime passages, such as the Strait of Gibraltar, the Suez Canal, the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Strait of Hormuz.
In essence, the Middle East serves as Russia’s southern gateway. Since ancient times, Tsarist Russia has sought to expand and establish an active presence in the region to gain access to warm waters. This ambition drove it to wage wars against the Persian and Ottoman Empires in the years 1813, 1826, 1828, 1829, and 1853.
The Soviet Union then sought to realize that long-standing dream by establishing a military presence during the 1960s and 1970s in Egypt, Ethiopia, Sudan, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Algeria, Iraq, and Syria. However, this presence gradually declined following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, took advantage of the hesitation of the Obama administration to make decisive decisions regarding the region’s crises, swiftly moving to fill the political and military vacuum that had emerged in the Middle East.
Russia aimed to use its presence in the region as a pressure card in dealing with the Ukrainian crisis, the annexation of Crimea, the missile defense shield, and the eastward expansion of NATO.
As mentioned earlier, American hesitation in certain arms deals contributed to Russia’s growing influence in the Middle East and its restoration of global stature through the formation of regional and international alliances. Moscow signed arms deals worth tens of billions of dollars with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, the Sultanate of Oman, Kuwait, Algeria, and the Arab Republic of Egypt.
Despite the financial significance of these deals, the main goal was to expand Russian influence. With the acquisition of new weapons, the importing countries would require military training and Russian experts, leading to significant adjustments in their military doctrines to align more closely with that of the Russian army.
Moreover, stability in the Middle East means stability along Russia’s southern borders and helps Moscow overcome the international isolation imposed on it after the war with Ukraine.
This was confirmed by the Director of the Russian Federal Service for Military-Technical Cooperation, Dmitry Shugayev, in his statement in November 2019 during an exhibition held in Dubai. He declared that “Russia exports more than two billion dollars’ worth of arms annually to the region, maintaining a stable share of 10% to 20%, while its military exports to Africa have reached 40%”. He also noted that the United Arab Emirates had requested to conduct tests of the Russian unmanned aerial vehicle “Orion-A” on its territory. The drone can carry two small bombs, has a *payload capacity of up to 200 kilograms, a wingspan of 16 meters, a length of 8 meters, and a speed ranging between 120 and 200 km/h. It can reach an altitude of 7,500 meters, operate at a range of up to 300 kilometers, and sustain flight duration of 24 hours.
For President Vladimir Putin, this represents an existential struggle with the United States of America, and the Middle East is the arena where he finds the leverage to assert this rivalry. Prior to the Russia–Ukraine crisis, the Middle East and North Africa had already emerged as the second-largest market for Russian arms, with Russia ranking second only to the United States in global arms exports. The Russian defensive presence in the Middle East rests on three main pillars: Arms sales, training on their use, and access to military bases and the deployment of paramilitary forces.
Although the Russian Federal Commission for Military Cooperation confirmed in 2021 that military exports to the Middle East had reached approximately 6 billion dollars over the past 5 years, representing between 40% and 50% of its total military exports, Algeria has been supplied with its most powerful and advanced defense systems, such as the Sukhoi Su-57 fighter jet.
However, these exports have faced a decline and some difficulties since the Russian-Ukrainian crisis. India, one of the largest importers of Russian weapons, has significantly reduced its imports. One reason may be the poor performance of some of these weapons during the Russian war with Ukraine, particularly tanks and armored vehicles. Nonetheless, Russian air defense systems have proven successful and have maintained a presence in the arms market. Another reason for this decline is the sanctions imposed on arms manufacturers with close ties to the Russian military. As a result, these companies, particularly helicopter manufacturers, have visited Saudi Arabia, followed by Russian President Putin’s visit to the United Arab Emirates, Russia’s main trading partner in the Arab world. Algeria also conducted a military dialogue with Russia at the end of 2023.
The Ukraine crisis has also weighed heavily on Rosoboronexport, a state-owned Russian arms manufacturer, which has sought to repatriate weapons it had exported to other countries to replenish its own stockpile of weapons used in Ukraine, particularly from Egypt. Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi had approved the delivery of approximately 150 engines and the shipment of 40,000 missiles, but the deal has stalled due to US pressure.
In return, Russia seeks to consolidate its military alliance with the Islamic Republic of Iran, as a US official from the National Security Council declared that “Russia is providing Iran with an unprecedented level of military and technical support, including fighter jets and Sukhoi Su-35 helicopters.”
This could also pose a threat to the Gulf States; in addition to Russian-Iranian-Chinese military exercises and maneuvers in late 2019. Iranian Brigadier General Allam Reza stated, “Relations between the three countries have reached a beneficial level.” This was also confirmed by the Russian Foreign Minister in 2023 when he confirmed progress in the Russian-Iranian treaty on a “comprehensive strategic partnership.”
Russia also seeks to obtain the right to dock at a naval base in eastern Libya, which would enhance its strategic and logistic capabilities. It also seeks to establish a naval base in Sudan with the aim of permanent access to the Suez Canal, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean, and the Arabian Peninsula.
In contrast to this Russian expansion, China has emerged as the world’s third-largest arms exporter, having surpassed Germany and France. It exports to more than 35 countries, including 18 African nations. It constantly seeks to bolster its position as an arms exporter by offering incentives to importing countries, which have demonstrated interest, evidenced by contracts concluded with the State-owned China North Industrial Group Corporation (CNIGC). These contracts include deals for the unmanned Skysaker drone, the CR500 helicopter, the Dragons Cruise aircraft, and the HR short-range air defense system. According to statements by Sòng Zhōngpíng, China is ready to sell high-tech weapons to friendly countries without conditions. China is seeking to expand its military sales market, exploring new markets such as Oceania, a large geographic region that includes Australia and others.
With an area of ​​8,525,989 km2, it boasts a diverse mix of highly developed and competitive economies and financial markets. China also focuses on medium-sized economies in the Pacific Islands. Oceania extends from the Strait of Malacca to the coast of the Asian continent. The importance of this strait lies in its role as the primary conduit for supplying oil to both China and Japan, two of the world’s largest consumers of this commodity.
Asia and Oceania accounted for 74% of Chinese arms imports, 6% for Africa, and 7% for the Middle East. Pakistan is the largest importer after the United States halted military aid to Islamabad. While China previously imported over 75% of its equipment from Russia, particularly C-435 fighters and surface-to-air missiles, as well as fighter jet systems and engines, Chinese arms manufacturers now rank among the top 25 companies in the world, as follows: Aviation Industry Corporation of China (AVIC) ranks sixth globally, China Electronics Technology Group Corporation (CEIC) ranks eighth, and Norinco ranks ninth, among others.
The Sales of the mentioned companies also increased by 5% at the beginning of 2020; however, despite the expansion of the Chinese geopolitical system, Chinese companies still have limited clients in the markets of North America and Western Europe, and the presence of Chinese companies in these regions is a quest to obtain Western expertise.
Furthermore, the trade of these companies is affiliated with the government. Therefore, despite the Israeli media claim that the IDF had discovered a large quantity of Chinese weapons used by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, Caris Wen, CEO of the Signal Group and an expert on Chinese-Israeli relations, confirmed that these weapons were not imported directly from China, which does not sell weapons to non-governmental entities.
Through arms trade, Beijing realizes that weapons are a strategic commodity linked to the state, and that armies will need technical support, spare parts, and more ammunition, thus ensuring dependency.
In response to this competition, Congress passed the Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) in 2017, which aims to impose sanctions on US adversaries such as North Korea, Iran, states that produce weapons of mass destruction, and Iran’s ballistic missile programs. The law prohibits the use or transfer of military equipment, or the provision of technical or financial assistance that contributes to Iran’s arms buildup. The law was applied to China in September 2018, imposing sanctions on the Equipment Development Department of the Chinese Ministry of Defense.
Amid these pressures and growing competition, China has begun seeking to expand its presence in Africa. In the context of strategic rivalry and ongoing efforts by major powers to showcase their strength—particularly in the defense industry—these nations aim to increase their exports, thereby boosting their national income. In addition, they seek to enhance their influence by sending forces to train soldiers and establishing military bases.
Following Africa’s move to free itself from French dependency, and in light of the sanctions imposed on Russia, as well as the continent’s absence from the list of U.S. priorities for arms exports, China found an opportunity to penetrate the African market and, consequently, assert its influence.
Consequently, China emerged as the second largest arms supplier to sub-Saharan Africa after Russia, accounting for 30% of the region’s imports, ahead of France with 7.7%. Chinese arms exports to sub-Saharan Africa amounted to $205 billion, or about 22% of total exports for 2023, which amounted to $932 billion. In contrast, Russian arms sales accounted for 24% of total exports to sub-Saharan Africa, while US sales to the region accounted for 5%.
Here arises a question: What distinguishes Chinese weaponry, allowing it to compete with Russian and American arms?
Chinese weapons are characterized by their affordability and the lack of burdensome political or economic conditions imposed on importing countries. Across the African continent, China sells more advanced and sophisticated weapons, and the purchase of these arms is directly linked to intensifying operations against rebels in certain African states.
This export activity has increased following the launch of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), with more than 60% of China’s arms exports directed toward sub-Saharan Africa. The distribution is as follows: Tanzania receives 20%, Nigeria 13.5%, Sudan 12.7%, Cameroon 11.3%, and Zambia 6.4%.
These arms-importing countries constitute China’s largest investment and construction projects, further strengthening the link between Chinese economic interests and security concerns. For example, Nigeria has been one of the most significant importers of Chinese weapons, attracting more than 14% of Chinese investment and construction projects. However, it has recently experienced security challenges such as Boko Haram attacks and armed robbery, prompting China to protect its interests.
As for the North African countries, they have contracts concluded with China, which are being implemented by the China North Industrial Group Corporation (CNIGC). These contracts include unmanned Skysaker, CR500 helicopters, Dragon5 cruise aircraft, and the HR short-range air defense system.
For its part, Norinco— China’s largest arms producer and the world’s seventh-largest supplier of military equipment— opened a new office in Senegal in 2023. Located in southwest Africa, this country is experiencing a regional crisis after the three countries—Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso— created the Sahel Confederation, which seeks to secure Russia’s interests in the region. The opening of Norinco’s office represents an advance and expansion of the Chinese influence in West Africa, and a challenge to the French and Russian influence.
With France’s influence in Africa declining and sanctions imposed on Russia, China has found itself expanding its presence. As of February 2023, it had become one of the top ten military and police contributors to three missions in Africa: the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, where it deployed 1,031 soldiers along with 18 officers and experts; the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; and the United Nations Mission for Peacekeeping in Mali.
In addition, China has provided logistical support to the African Union Mission in Somalia. The total number of Chinese troops participating in Peacekeeping Forces has exceeded 2,250 soldiers. Moreover, the number of Chinese military attachés increased from 10 to 27 in 2023, accompanied by a rise in Chinese naval visits to ports in Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Senegal, Nigeria, and Cameroon.
More importantly, China has invested heavily in military education, with the Chinese army training around 2,000 African military officers each year. Between 2018 and 2022, over 2,000 African police officers and law enforcement personnel received training in the People’s Armed Police academies.
China also offers nearly 100,000 scholarships, with military education accounting for about 4% to 7% of them. The educational system of the People’s Liberation Army covers more than five professional career tracks.
The Chinese Army Command College in Beijing has become particularly popular among African nations. Ten African presidents and eight defense ministers are among its graduates — including former President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Laurent Kabila, and current leaders such as Eritrea’s President Isaias Afwerki and Zimbabwe’s President Emmerson Mnangagwa.
To further strengthen African security, the China–Africa Defense and Security Forum was held in Beijing in 2018, bringing together China and representatives from 50 African countries. The forum led to the establishment of the African Standby Force (ASF), along with programs focused on maintaining security, combating piracy, and countering terrorism.
During the forum, Chinese President Xi Jinping announced the allocation of military aid to the African Union, in addition to more than $320 million to support the development of the Joint Force of the (G5 du Sahel), which was founded in 2017 under a UN initiative and includes Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.
China also has its only military base in Africa, in Djibouti; established as a result of a joint project between the two countries under a defense and security treaty, aiming to train Djibouti’s armed forces. The base is located in the port of Oyok and overlooks Tabora Bay. It was the first time China had sent troops outside the country to carry out peacekeeping missions and protect Chinese citizens and interests in Africa. The base is located 13 to 14 km from the US Limonia Base.
China’s military presence in Africa has become increasingly evident in various forms. It began with activities at the port of Bata in Equatorial Guinea, which — according to U.S. claims — has been transformed into a Chinese naval base. In addition, the role of Chinese private security companies in Africa has grown significantly, including firms such as PSC, HXZA, FSC, OSG, and DeWe. Their operations range from protecting personnel and fleets to even transporting weapons — despite the fact that Chinese law prohibits private security companies from using firearms.
What are the objectives of China’s military and security presence in Africa?
Protecting Chinese citizens, workers, and investors:
China has over 10,000 companies and more than one million nationals operating across Africa. Incidents of kidnapping, piracy, and extortion targeting Chinese nationals — particularly in Nigeria and Guinea — have resulted in losses exceeding $20 billion.
Safeguarding its economic interests:
China’s focus is on securing access to vital and natural resources, as oil and minerals account for around 84% of its imports from Africa.
Securing international trade routes and maritime navigation:
Africa borders some of the world’s most strategic waterways, including the Indian Ocean, Atlantic Ocean, and key chokepoints such as the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, the Mozambique Channel, and the Gulf of Guinea.
Isolating Taiwan diplomatically:
China seeks to prevent any African nation from recognizing Taiwan.
Expanding Chinese arms sales in the region:
China’s military exports have grown significantly in Nigeria and Ghana—the largest importers of Chinese weapons in West Africa—alongside Cameroon and Chad.
Linking arms sales with access to natural resources; particularly in oil and minerals.
Deepening ties with African nations diplomatically:
Africa’s voting bloc within the United Nations holds great significance for China, which may rely on African support in its global economic competition.
Beyond its growing dominance in Africa, the competition among major powers has also expanded to Georgia — a country strategically positioned at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, and the only South Caucasus nation with access to the oceans.
Georgia has become a key hub for alternative energy supply routes designed to bypass Russia, extending from Central Asia across the Caspian Sea to Europe. This westward shift has accelerated the nation’s development and attracted foreign investment.
Over the past decade, Georgia has pursued a pragmatic, multi-dimensional policy — seeking to avoid hostility with Russia, and maintain relations with the European Union, and open its doors to Chinese influence at the same time. Consequently, its site and policies have become a focal point of conflict, contributing to a state of political ambiguity and domestic instability. As a result, Georgia increased its international partnerships and, since 2013, it has been among the priority countries in the Belt and Road Initiative. Investments from China have since flowed into Georgia, with a free trade agreement signed between the two countries in 2017, and visa requirements were abolished in 2024. Furthermore, Georgia granted China the right to build a port on the Black Sea coast — a move that provoked anger in both Washington and Moscow.
Amid this rivalry, Georgia sought to abandon its hostile rhetoric toward Russia, refraining from imposing sanctions and continuing to benefit from economic relations with Moscow. It also provided no assistance to Ukrainians except for hosting refugees who fled to its territory. In return, Russia lifted restrictions on Georgian imports in 2013, abolished the visa requirements for Georgian citizens, and lifted the ban on direct flights in 2023.
Hence, war has become a necessity for major powers — both to dominate regions rich in natural resources and to find markets for their arms industries. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the world’s top five arms exporters between 2014 and 2018 were, respectively: the United States, Russia, France, Germany, and China. The Middle East accounted for 52% of U.S. arms exports, while Russian arms sales to Middle Eastern countries increased by 19% between 2015 and 2019.
Great power competition has accelerated in the wake of the Russo-Ukrainian War, and the new world order includes three great powers: Russia, China, and the United States. The Russo-Ukrainian War represents a new global upheaval since the Cold War, serving as a real-life experiment in great power warfare. China and Russia issued a joint statement declaring that their partnership was greater than a traditional alliance and that their friendship would know no boundaries.
In fact, the Russia-US dispute has had a negative impact on both countries. Trade relations between the two countries collapsed between 2013 and 2024, and have continued to decline since 2022, during the presidency of Joe Biden. Total US trade in goods with Russia was estimated at only $3.5 billion, compared to $11.1 billion during Barack Obama’s presidency. Mutual investments increased in 2019, with a large number of US companies investing in the Russian market, estimated at approximately $14.17 billion in 2019, while they declined to $7.67 billion in 2023.
The Russian economy has benefited greatly from the presence of American companies, providing jobs for more than 410,000 people in 2021 and generating annual revenues of $12.2 billion in 2021, compared to $7.67 billion in 2023. In return, Russia has extensive options within the United States through private investment funds, and Russian foreign investment in the United States rose to $13.3 billion in 2022.
The Russian-American rivalry has had profoundly negative effects, primarily through the imposition of Western sanctions on the Russian economy since 2014 under the pretext of the Russia-Ukraine war. These sanctions have hindered Russia’s ability to borrow from foreign financial markets and limited its access to Western investments and modern technologies. Moreover, more than a thousand international companies have withdrawn from the Russian market, leading to negative growth rates since the second quarter of 2022. Although growth rates improved up to the first quarter of 2024, they began to decline again in the third quarter of 2024, dropping from 5.4% to 3.1%. Subsequently, the European Union imposed additional sanctions on the Russian economy.
All of this has prompted Russia to accelerate negotiations with the United States, which appear to be on a path toward success. Russia’s motivation lies in its desire to ease sanctions, especially since they target vital sectors such as military trade and the Russian military-industrial complex, with more than 53 entities added to the sanctions list. The banking sector has also been affected, as restrictions were imposed on transactions involving credit or financial institutions established outside Russia that use the 5pf5 message transfer system of the Russian Central Bank, in addition to other economically significant sectors.
The restoration of relations between Russia and the United States is expected to lead to faster and more sustainable economic growth and to compensate for the losses resulting from European sanctions. On the other hand, American companies have lost more than 300 billion dollars due to their withdrawal from the Russian market. The U.S. economy has also been negatively affected by the severance of relations with Russia, which is the world’s largest supplier of low-cost fertilizers. As a result, inflation has increased in agricultural and food commodity prices, as well as in energy prices, leading to a rise in overall inflation rates in the United States. The Federal Reserve has been unable to achieve its targeted interest rate of 2%, with inflation reaching 3% in January 2025. Additionally, the United States imports about 8% of its crude oil and related product needs from Russia.
Given this economic significance, both nations are striving to restore their relations — particularly in terms of economic cooperation. This effort has become evident through negotiations held in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia between the Russian envoy, Kirill Dmitriev, Chief Investment Director at the Kremlin, and the U.S. envoy, Steve Mnuchin. The talks aim to remove artificial barriers hindering the development of economic cooperation, with expectations that some American companies will return to the Russian market. Moreover, former President Trump is seeking a peace agreement concerning the Russia–Ukraine war, which indicates that capital flows between the two countries are likely to increase.
In reality, global trade has suffered significantly in recent years due to the Russia–Ukraine war. Russia occupies a major position in global economic integration, being the primary supplier of natural gas and various minerals such as titanium, aluminum, and nickel, among others. When its export share declined as a result of global economic sanctions—from 29.1% in 2021 to 23.1% in 2023—global prices surged.
With the end of the Russia–Ukraine war, Russian global trade and exports across various supply chains are expected to recover, positively impacting the economies of developing nations. Additionally, Russia has withdrawn its support for the BRICS common currency, and it is likely that the 2025 BRICS Summit will decide to conduct transactions in local currencies instead.
The Cold War environment was characterized by a fierce conflict between two ideologically different poles within a process of polarizing the world’s countries under the theory that every advance toward the opponent was tantamount to gaining strategic depth, while simultaneously providing a definite ability to encircle the opposing pole. The fall of the Soviet Union led to the emergence of regions on the international scene, with Central Asia being geographically located at the heart of the world, and whoever controls it controls the world. It is a geographical and strategic bridge between Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Russia asserts that one of its most important foreign policy priorities is enabling integration with the former Soviet republics. The Russian-Chinese political and economic alliance also created a favorable environment for a struggle for influence.
China seeks to assert control over Taiwan and secure energy sources to sustain its powerful economy, yet it feels that the United States is working to contain and challenge it. The U.S. has surrounded China with a network of military bases across Japan, the Philippines, South Korea, Vietnam, and Thailand — a strategic encirclement that limits China’s naval power. Nearly 70% of China’s energy supplies pass through the Strait of Malacca, and if the U.S. were to block it, China’s economy would come to a standstill.
China lacks its own significant energy resources, while Russia possesses vast reserves, especially in its Asian territories. However, Russia’s eastern regions suffer from a shortage of labor and capital and lag behind its western part in development.
Thus, with China’s available capital and abundant workforce, it can exploit the resources of eastern Russia. Through oil and gas pipelines, China could shield itself from the American threat of a blockade in the Strait of Malacca. Hence, the growing Sino-Russian partnership represents a strategic and mutually beneficial necessity.
This alliance and cooperation are, in fact, indispensable. A look back into history reveals that Russia and China have long experienced fierce struggles for dominance in East Asia, dating back to the Mongol invasion of Russia and extending into the 20th century through conflicts such as the Russo-Japanese War (1905–1945). China also endured violent confrontations with European powers — between 1839 and 1949, it was effectively partitioned between Britain and Japan, suffering from humiliation and decline until the victory of the Communist Revolution.
Furthermore, during the Opium War of 1858, China was mired in a devastating civil conflict that claimed millions of lives. Russia seized the opportunity, amassing tens of thousands of troops along the Chinese border and demanding sovereignty over Outer Manchuria. Unable to open another front, China ceded the territory to Russia through the 1860 treaty. That region now includes key parts of eastern Russia, such as Khabarovsk and Vladivostok — the latter being Russia’s largest port on the Pacific Ocean. Without Vladivostok, Russia’s nuclear naval power in the Far East would not have held significant weight.
This treaty deprived China of its coastline along the Sea of Japan, leaving it only with access to the East and South China Seas — had it not been for this, the Sea of Japan might today have been under Chinese sovereignty. In 1986, conflict between the two nations flared up once again along the rivers forming their mutual border. Russia claimed that the boundary lay along the Russian banks of the rivers, while China countered that the islands within the rivers belonged to it and that the true border should be drawn along the midline of the waterways. The dispute escalated into armed clashes, prompting Russia to threaten the use of nuclear weapons.
Although the confrontation formally ended in 1991 with the demarcation of borders between the two countries, this resolution did not mean that the underlying tensions were permanently laid to rest.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, China quickly moved to establish strong ties with the newly independent states that emerged, aiming to integrate them into its vision for the Silk Road initiative. Central Asia holds great strategic importance for China as a vital source of energy, ensuring a steady flow of natural gas through pipelines from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan — supplying more than 15% of China’s natural gas needs and bypassing the Strait of Malacca.
To put this in perspective, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are Russia’s competitors in exporting gas to China, which has now become the largest market for Russian gas following the imposition of European sanctions. Consequently, China has surpassed Russia in trade dealings with Central Asian countries. Both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have also refused to join the Eurasian Alliance — Russia’s proposed framework intended to rival the European Union.
This growing alliance between China and the Central Asian nations has become a significant obstacle to Russia’s long-standing ambition to maintain dominance over the region. Central Asia represents Russia’s “soft underbelly,” a gateway to the vast Eurasian plain — a historic invasion route into Russian territory. China, capitalizing on Russia’s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine and its confrontation with NATO, has extended its influence over Central Asia. Yet, a crucial question remains: how long will Russia remain silent in the face of China’s expanding reach?
In addition to its lack of energy resources, China also suffers from a severe water shortage. Although it is home to 20% of the world’s population, it possesses only 7% of the planet’s freshwater resources. Moreover, 80% of China’s limited water supply is concentrated in the southern regions — areas with relatively low population density — while the north, which holds the highest concentration of people, has significantly less access to water. Nearly 400 million people live in northern China, where water must be transported through pipelines.
Climate change and rising global temperatures have further worsened China’s crisis. In 2022, a devastating drought struck the country, drying up the Yangtze River Basin — China’s largest and most vital water source, located in the southern Himalayas region.
The water-scarce north lies close to Russia, which possesses one of the world’s greatest untapped freshwater reserves: Lake Baikal. This vast lake contains roughly one-quarter of the world’s surface freshwater — enough to supply global needs for over fifty years. Chinese companies have sought to purchase land near the lake, and in 2017 China announced plans to build water pipelines connecting the lake to its territory. However, Russia firmly opposed the project, viewing it as a strategic threat to its natural resources.
What compels China and Russia to maintain their alliance is the existence of a common adversary. The United States and its allies encircle China from the east and south, just as they surround Russia from the west. Were it not for this shared external pressure, the old tensions between Moscow and Beijing might have resurfaced long ago.
China, in fact, admires President Putin’s defiance of the United States and Europe. It benefits greatly from purchasing Russian oil resources at discounted prices and from expanding its trade links with Central Asia — all while the U.S. remains distracted from the Indo-Pacific region. Yet, a crucial question lingers: if the Russian leadership were to change, would China seek to assert itself and reclaim the territories once taken by Russia?
As an old Arab proverb says: “When the snow melts, the grass will show.” But in this case, the melting of the Arctic snow due to global warming has revealed not green pastures — but a new arena of global competition among Russia, the United States, and China.
But what is this competition about?
In fact, the Arctic is the highest region on Earth, overlooked by Norway and Denmark from Europe, Russia from Asia, and Canada and America from North America. Sweden, Finland, and Iceland also own territories within it, which they administer through an Arctic Council, which China joined as an observer member in 2013.
As frozen seas turn into liquids, navigation between China and the United States could be cut by a full week, potentially transforming the Suez Canal into a shipping route between Asia and Europe, saving hundreds of thousands of dollars. According to 2009 data from the U.S. Geological Survey, the region also contains approximately 30% of the world’s undiscovered natural gas reserves and 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil reserves.
The reserves are estimated at about a trillion dollars. Russia, America, and China all realize that the hope of future generations will depend on each country’s ability to secure its interests there. However, Russia still holds the upper hand there, having outpaced everyone else since planting its flag at the bottom of the pole in 2007. It has extracted approximately 25% of its gas production and 20% of its oil from it, and has invested economically and militarily by establishing military bases and building fifty giant icebreakers, including eleven nuclear-powered icebreakers, as well as deploying thousands of emplacements and radars.
Russia also sought to attract foreign investment to the Arctic, with Russian President Vladimir Putin stating that he wanted to connect the Northern Sea Route to China’s Silk Road trade route. China declared itself a sub-Arctic nation, arguing that all stakeholders should participate in its management, not just the countries that own territories there. This annoyed Russia, but it nevertheless encouraged it, recognizing that China was pursuing private projects rather than profitable investments. It spent $90 billion between 2012 and 2017 in preparation for 2030, when it is expected that all the ice will melt, leaving the region open to navigation without the need for Russian icebreakers or their oversight.
According to a Wall Street Journal report, this Russian-Chinese expansion worries America. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said that although his country has lagged behind in establishing its influence in the Arctic, it is capable of making up for that. Indeed, it reinforced its military presence in mid-2020 by sending a squadron of F-35 aircraft, which, according to The National Interest, could serve as a deterrent to any Russian or Chinese incursion. Nevertheless, there remains the possibility of a climate miracle that would halt the rise in temperature and the melting of the ice until 2030, halting the ambitions of major powers because without this melting, investment would be too costly.
Confirming U.S. concerns over China’s growing global influence, the 2022 National Security Strategy—a document issued every five years by the American administration to outline its global defense and strategic priorities—explicitly identified China as the sole competitor possessing both the intent and the capability to reshape the international order. The report emphasized that China wields the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological resources necessary to pursue this goal. According to the document, the United States would need a decade to effectively counter China’s rise — a decade that will determine Washington’s future standing on the global stage. In essence, China has been officially classified as America’s primary rival.
At the same time, Russia too harbors deep apprehensions about China’s expansion. Economically, the disparity between the two nations has become stark. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), China’s economic growth has outpaced Russia’s by a factor of ten. While China recorded a trade surplus of $676 billion, Russia’s stood at only $197.3 billion. The IMF also projects that China’s GDP will reach $30 trillion by 2027, whereas Russia’s will remain below $1 trillion. Therefore, the imbalance has strained the foundations of their partnership. In 2021, Beijing accounted for 18% of Russia’s total trade, making it Moscow’s largest trading partner. Conversely, Russia represented only 2% of China’s trade volume—a gap that has continued to widen due to the ongoing Russia–Ukraine war.
China, while maintaining its ties with President Putin, has skillfully navigated the geopolitical tensions in Eastern Europe, ensuring that its relations with Europe remain intact and beneficial. As Russia’s economy faltered under sanctions, China filled the vacuum left by departing Western companies, strengthening its foothold in the Russian market.
Despite the overall stagnation of Russian trade amid the war, bilateral trade in goods between Russia and China surged to $17.2 billion in the early months of the conflict—an increase of 13.2%, with energy resources comprising about 70% of this exchange. However, this reliance is now at risk. China has begun taking strategic steps to reduce its dependence on fossil fuels, moving instead toward renewable energy sources such as wind and solar power, in line with its long-term goal of lowering carbon emissions.
The relationship between Russia and China is extremely delicate. Both nations share common interests on certain fronts, yet each holds non-negotiable priorities—making their partnership distinct from traditional international alliances. What differentiates them most is their global presence. China has emerged as a rising power with expanding economic influence, while Russia maintains primarily military and security expertise but with limited economic weight.
Although Beijing’s growing role may gradually diminish Russia’s influence in Central Asia and the Middle East, Moscow remains preoccupied with its war in Ukraine—aimed at preventing NATO’s advance toward its borders. Meanwhile, China continues to expand and consolidate its power, recently extending its reach beyond economic cooperation by providing military support to Kazakhstan, a nation long regarded by Russia as part of its historical sphere of influence.
Through this move, China has effectively crossed a strategic threshold—transforming its engagement in the region from purely economic collaboration to direct military involvement.
Russia has sought to emulate China’s economic model through the launch of the Meridian Highway Project, also known domestically as the Russian Silk Road. This $9 billion project spans nearly 2,000 kilometers, extending from the Russian-Kazakh border to Belarus. It is envisioned as an integral segment of a broader international transport corridor linking Europe and western China. The project aims to strengthen Russia’s economic and political ties with its traditional spheres of influence. However, it also serves as a direct competitor to China’s Belt and Road Initiative — even though its realization remains uncertain due to the ongoing sanctions imposed on Russia.
The strategic rivalry between the two powers has intensified to the point of military competition. China recently conducted joint military exercises with Tajikistan, prompting Russia to respond with similar maneuvers on Tajikistan’s border with Afghanistan, citing the pretext of countering the infiltration of Islamist fighters from former Soviet republics in Central Asia. However, this was a clear message to Beijing that Russia will not tolerate Chinese interference in the former Soviet states, which it continues to regard as its own geopolitical backyard.
China cannot afford to overlook the strategic importance of Central Asia. With its rapidly growing economy and expanding population, Beijing inevitably turned its attention to the region’s vast reserves of oil, gas, and minerals. Central Asia holds an estimated 40 billion barrels of oil and more than 500 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. Taking advantage of Russia’s preoccupation with its war in Ukraine and its economic limitations, China — with its formidable $4 trillion in foreign exchange reserves and advanced technological capabilities — has positioned itself as the largest direct investor in the region.
Beijing also has begun laying the groundwork for a security presence in Central Asia. During his visit to Kazakhstan, President Xi Jinping pledged to safeguard the country’s independence following signs of tension between Kazakhstan and Russia due to Kazakhstan’s neutral stance on the Ukraine war. This declaration was a subtle yet unmistakable warning to Russia.
As China continues to advance technologically, it has begun to reduce its dependence on Russian military technology. The once-strong reliance on importing Russian weapons has steadily declined since Beijing launched a long-term program to capitalize on its own progress in missile systems, nuclear capabilities, and artificial intelligence — a development that now alarms both the United States and Russia. For Russia, this trend poses a serious economic and strategic concern. Russia fears not only the decline in its arms exports to China, but also the possibility that Beijing’s defense innovations could target Central Asian countries — nations that have long been major importers of Russian weaponry. Such a shift would undermine one of Russia’s last remaining instruments of influence in the region.
This fear is magnified by Russia’s experience in the Middle East, where it has worked to consolidate its presence through the establishment of several naval and ground bases and by intervening militarily in the Syrian war in defense of its allies. In contrast, Washington’s withdrawal from its traditional Arab partners after the Arab Spring — most notably its abandonment of Hosni Mubarak in Egypt — sent shockwaves across the Arab world.
In addition to Syria, Moscow has sought to forge close ties with the Gulf states; primarily with Saudi Arabia through joint coordination to regulate oil markets and consensus on several political issues. Moscow also sought to forge close ties with the United Arab Emirates, through unprecedented trade and investment growth, which has become a safe haven for Russian oligarchs fleeing Western sanctions. Moscow also reached an understanding with Qatar that neither side would encroach on the other’s share in order to protect their traditional exports. Moscow has also resumed supplying the Egyptian army with weapons and economic projects in the Suez Canal region, and built the country’s first nuclear reactor in Dabaa on the Mediterranean coast.
China, in turn, has become a major trading partner for all Arab countries, surpassing America economically in its traditional Gulf region of influence, and becoming the largest importer of Arab oil. It also maintains good relations with all the conflicting parties: Palestine, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran, leading to its mediation, under which relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran were resumed for the first time since 2016.
For more than ten years, Russia has sought to involve China in the reconstruction of Syria, as well as in the oil sector. Before the start of the Syrian civil war, China was one of the largest investors in the Syrian oil industry. Trade between the two countries before 2010; i.e. before the war, amounted to approximately $248 billion. Approximately thirty Chinese companies operated in Syria, and China ranked first among Syria’s trading partners, accounting for 63% of Russian trade.
China and Russia stand as friends and allies on one front — united against their shared rival, the United States — yet on another, they are competitors, each seeking to extend its influence across the Middle East, the former Soviet republics, the Arctic region, and Africa.
Both powers pursue their own strategic interests, each recognizing the necessity of partnership, yet neither forgetting the historical rivalries and wounds that time has not erased. In this context, war becomes the ultimate instrument for asserting dominance, reshaping global power structures, and subduing nations — all while opening new markets for the global arms trade.
In conclusion:
The ongoing struggle for control over markets, trade routes, and mineral resources clearly illustrates that a confrontation is inevitable. What is unfolding today in Central Asia — particularly in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan — signals the beginning of a new geopolitical contest.
In 2023, US President Joe Biden held the first-ever meeting with the heads of the five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan) to find alternative corridors after the Russian-Ukrainian war, in order to diversify trade ties and economic resilience through the Central Asia Corridor. There was also the meeting between the Chinese President and the leaders of the Central Asian countries in 2024 to resume work on the Galkynysh gas field in Turkmenistan. There was also the meeting between Russian President Vladimir Putin and the Kazakh President at the Astana Summit, where Russia was the security guarantor for the Central Asian countries. Moscow’s extensive military presence in Kyrgyzstan and the remittances of Asian migrants from Russia, which constitute nearly 30% of Kyrgyzstan’s GDP alone, were also discussed.
In addition to the Arab and Asian regional cooperation and the extensive Turkish presence in the Central Asian region, especially in trade between the two sides, where the volume of trade between Turkey and Kazakhstan reached 4.7%, Tajikistan 5.3%, and Kyrgyzstan 6.4%, and the Indian-Asian meeting, the Delhi Summit, which upset India’s traditional ally when India proposed a project to facilitate the services of the “Shahid Beheshti Terminal” in the port of Chabahar in the Islamic Republic of Iran to link Central Asia with India, and the meeting between the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, and the President of Kyrgyzstan, Sadyr Japarov. The summit was also attended by the Presidents of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan.
But ultimately, the most serious question is: Why, after all these alignments and alliances, did the project fail? It almost changed the face of the world by sparking a devastating direct war between Turkey and Iran on Syrian soil, and who was harmed by the project’s failure?
Are Turkey and Iran non-sectarian peoples and nations, and is sectarianism limited to rogue nations?
Why did the agreement with Russia become inevitable after the failure to ignite a Turkish-Iranian war along the lines of the Iraqi-Iranian one?
And, who wants to win over Iran and to whose benefit after the failure of the Syrian-Israeli security agreement?
Also, why have the Balkan, Greek, and Cypriot issues once again resurfaced in Turkey’s historically present situation?
Why are those crowds in Greece from Britain, Israel, America, and elsewhere, and who is watching them there?
Why is U.S. President Donald Trump threatening to raise customs tariffs by 100% on anyone importing Russian oil and gas, while at the same time American companies are returning to the heart of Moscow?
Does India’s and China’s approval to resolve the border dispute at this particular time mean the withdrawal of a regional card from American hands — or is it with U.S. blessing in pursuit of a settlement with China?
What is the connection between Ukraine and the Gaza war? Why doesn’t the war in Ukraine stop? Who benefits from it?
If the Ukraine war were to end, would European attention turn toward supporting the independence of a Palestinian state?
Finally, why is Iran displacing Afghans — and what is their link to the recent war with Israel? And what is the fate of the Pakistani-Saudi-Egyptian military alliance?

Khaled Zein Eddine
Editor-in-Chief of the European Arab International Newspaper
Member of the International Federation of Journalists in Brussels
Member of the Journalists’ Union in Poland